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Abstract. This study analyzes the equity effects of public subsidization of private schools in Côte 
d’Ivoire, updates previous analyses, and attempts to assess how efficiently public spending is 
targeted.  The subsidy per student in private (and public) schools increases at higher quintiles.  
Students from families in the highest quintile receive more than twice the subsidy received by 
students from families in the lowest quintile, compared with four times more in the case of 
students attending public schools.  However, the subsidy system is progressive as there is a clear 
tendency for the share of family education expenditure covered by subsidies to decline at higher 
quintiles.  This element of progressivity is stronger in the case of private school attendance. 
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In 1997/98 the number of students enrolled in Côte d’Ivoire’s educational institutions 
stood at 2.4 million, compared with 1.9 million in 1991/92 and 2.1 million in 1994/95.  The gross 
primary enrollment (GPE) ratio had been increasing from the 1950s to the 1970s, peaking at 
about 77 percent in the early 1980s.  Thereafter, it slowly decreased and by 1996/97 it stood at 
about 72 percent (Ministry of Education 1997a); it was higher for boys, at 82 percent, compared 
with 61 percent for girls.  Likewise, the gross secondary enrollment (GSE) ratio increased 
through the 1960s and 1970s, with small increases in the 1980s.  By the late 1980s and early 
1990s, it had stabilized, even declining slightly (Demery and others 1996).  In 1996/97 the GSE 
ratio stood at 28 percent (36 percent for boys and 20 percent for girls).  Finally, between 1974 
(when the University of Côte d’Ivoire was established) and the early 1990s, tertiary-level 
enrollments (which include students in university and tertiary technical institutions) increased 
five-fold.  This increase accelerated in the 1990s.  Close to 100 percent of tertiary institution 
students in Côte d’Ivoire come from families in the top quintile of the income distribution.  In 
1995 gross enrollment ratios were lower for girls compared with boys (60 versus 79 percent for 
primary, and 24 versus 38 percent for secondary), the poor (51 percent for the lowest quintile 
versus 99 for the top quintile for primary, and 12 percent for the lowest quintile versus 65 
percent for the top quintile for secondary) and in rural areas (63 percent versus 92 percent in 
urban areas for primary, and 13 percent versus 54 percent for secondary). 
 
The education sector in Côte d’Ivoire suffers from high dropout rates.  By age 7, almost 
half the children are not enrolled in schools. Two out of three children in urban areas and four 
out of five in rural areas work full or part time (World Bank 1999).  Indirect (but strong)   2
evidence of high repetition rates, as well as poor internal efficiency, can be found in the number 
of years needed to complete different levels of education.  For example, it takes 8.9 years to 
complete primary school (expected 6), 5.6 years for lower secondary (expected 4), and 7.5 for 
the baccalaureate degree (expected 3) (World Bank 1995).  However, repetition rates are much 
lower in private religious schools, compared with private secular and public schools. 
 
Literature Review 
Research on the distributional impact of public subsidies for education (recurrent 
expenditure net of costs recovered through fees) originates in the United States (see, for example, 
Hansen and Weisbrod 1969).  These studies conclude that poor families finance the education of 
children of high-income families.  That is, net subsidies for higher education are regressive. 
Research from household surveys using unit cost data and information on publicly subsidized 
education in nine African countries concludes that the education subsidy system is progressive, 
but poorly targeted. In Côte d’Ivoire (as well as in Guinea, Madagascar, South Africa, Tanzania 
and Uganda), the poorest 20 percent gain about 20 percent of the primary education subsidy, 
about 10 percent of the secondary education subsidy and a minimal percent of the tertiary level 
subsidy (Castro-Leal and others 1999).  Recent research by Li, Steele and Glewwe (1999) 
provides similar results. In Côte d’Ivoire (as well as in Nepal, Nicaragua and Vietnam), the 
richest 20 percent of the population receive more than 30 percent of all public education 
expenditure. 
 
  Very little research has been carried out on private school issues in African countries. A 
notable exception is Tanzania.  Reversing policies of restricting private secondary education, the   3
government of Tanzania in the mid-1980s supported the rapid expansion of the non-government 
sector in response to high excess demand.  However, the new policies had little impact on 
student learning or school effectiveness, and at the same time resulted in widening social 
inequities and increased competition among schools for teachers and school heads.  The findings 
suggest a possible need to refine policies, through selective subsidies to low-income students and 
to schools that offer high-value added education (Lassibille and others 1998). 
 
In analyzing the impact of public spending for public and private education, the equity 
concern is the main focus of this study.  The equity concern has also been the focus of a number 
of studies on the distributional impact of government spending for public schooling (Hansen and 
Weisbrod 1969; Pechman 1970; Mehmet 1978; van de Walle and Nead 1995; Antoninis and 
Tsakloglou 2001) using benefit incidence analysis. However, there have been few studies 
analyzing the equity effects of public subsidies for private schooling. 
 
Earlier studies (Meerman 1979; Selowsky 1979) using benefit incidence analysis showed 
that public costs per household (as a proxy for benefits received) for students in assisted schools 
are pro-poor for primary education, pro-middle income for secondary education and strongly 
pro-rich for post-secondary education.  The explanation for observing such a pattern is that poor 
households had more children in primary education and, therefore, benefited from utilizing the 
system.  However, as the enrollment from poor households decreased for higher educational 
levels, the poor were less likely to benefit (Yang 2002). 
 
Recent evidence is available from some developing countries (Selden and Wasylenko   4
1992).  For Indonesia, the analysis of the distribution of subsidies among different expenditure 
quintiles shows that spending on primary education tends to be pro-poor while spending on 
higher education is clearly less beneficial to the poor (Lanjouw and others 2001).  For Malawi, 
secondary and higher education are highly pro-rich with the richest quintile receiving 58 percent 
of all public subsidies for higher education (Castro-Leal 1996).  In Ghana, the results indicate 
that the distribution of public spending for primary education is pro-poor, while for secondary 
and higher less so (Demery and others 1995).  However, after controlling for demographic 
characteristics (such as number of school age children in each quintile), primary education is less 
pro-poor. 
 
This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the poverty impact of public 
subsidization of private schools in Côte d’Ivoire, and updates a previous analysis by Demery and 
others (1996).  It attempts to assess how efficiently public spending is targeted to the poor in a 
large African country, by looking at who benefits from public expenditure on education in 
different income groups.  Côte d’Ivoire has a large subsidy program for private school 
attendance (which can be considered as a sort of a voucher scheme, but more of an example of 
the state contracting out education services to the private sector). 
 
Contracting Out Education 
Côte d’Ivoire legislation provides the foundation for private sector participation in 
education on the principle that, while education is a public service, private institutions may be 
granted the right to offer that public service.  In effect, the government is contracting out 
education services.  Therefore, a favorable environment toward this end was created. Decree 97-  5
675 (1997) outlines the regulatory framework for private sector participation in education. 
Agreements with private secular and religious schools specify the per-student subsidy amount, 
registration requirements, reporting requirements, and other rights and responsibilities of private 
schools and the government.  The specifics of the policies allow for the provision of subsidies to 
providers, as well as sponsoring “public” students to attend private schools.  Private schools are 
either “authorized” or “chartered/associated.”  Only the latter can attract subsidies for state 
sponsored students. 
 
  To benefit from public subsidies, the petitioning private establishment must satisfy the 
following criteria: 
(a)  Has been in operation for at least five years 
(b)  Has teachers certified for at least the last three years 
(c)  Has a maximum of 45 pupils per class 
(d)  Charges 40,000 CFA (Communauté financière de l'Afrique) Francs ($67) or less per 
year outside Abidjan, or 30,000 CFA Francs ($50) or less in Abidjan 
(e)  Has achieved at least national average success rates in examinations for the last three 
years of operation. 
 
Private schools are funded both in cash and in-kind.  How a school is funded depends on 
whether the school is primary or secondary and whether it is secular or religious.  Primary 
schools are funded via subsidies.  Secondary schools (secular as well as religious) are funded 
through the state sponsoring students to attend private schools.  Therefore, this arrangement 
bears great similarity to a voucher scheme.  However, vouchers imply the element of school   6
choice (Friedman 1955), which while not absent in the Côte d’Ivoire context, is less central.  The 
arrangement is more like contracting out education services – or some form of mandate from the 
state (Murphy and others 1996; Savas 2000). 
 
Subsidies vary according to fee level (the higher the fee charged by the school, the lower 
the subsidy) and region (schools in Abidjan receive less than those outside Abidjan) (World 
Bank 1999).  For example, in 1995/96 the government paid the equivalent of $66 per student per 
year to religious schools outside Abidjan whose fees are less than $50, while it paid $41 per 
student per year in Abidjan whose fees are less than the equivalent of $83. Schools with fees 
above those levels do not receive any subsidy (World Bank 1999).  The state pays private lower-
secondary schools $200 and private upper-secondary schools $233 per student per year for 
students it sponsors to attend private schools. 
 
Private Education Sector 
It is estimated that in 1997/98 there were 432,277 private school students in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The share of private students in the education market in Côte d’Ivoire was 18 percent 
(12 percent at the primary level and 36 percent at the secondary level).  The private sector share 
of enrollments varies across the different levels (Table 1).  In 1997/98, 49 percent of students in 
private institutions were at the primary level, while 44 percent were at the secondary level and 
about 6 percent were at the tertiary professional and technical levels; none were at the academic 
level (Table 1).  Between 1991/92 and 1997/98, the proportion of students in private institutions 
grew at annual rates of 9 percent for primary, 13 percent for secondary, and 490 percent for 
tertiary institutions (albeit from a very small base for the latter).   7
Table 1: Distribution of Private Education Students, 1997/98 
Level Number  of  Students  Distribution  by 
Education Level 
% of Students in 
Private Schools 
Primary 213,634  49.4  11.8 
Secondary 191,663  44.3  36.0 
Tertiary (Professional)  27,980  6.3  100.0 
Total 432,277  100.0  17.7 
Source: INS, Statistical, Demographic and Social Directory (ASDS), 2002 [NOT IN REFS] 
 
  Public support to the private education sector grew constantly throughout the 1990s, with 
spending increasing from $25.7 million in 1993 to $38.8 million in 2001.  At the same time, the 
number of recipients of public support in the private education sector increased from 116,210 in 
1993 to 223,244 in 2001, an increase of 92 percent.  For example, in 1999, at the primary level 
close to half of the pupils in private schools benefited form public support, compared to about 
one-third of the students at the secondary level and about two-thirds of the higher technical 
education students. 
 
Private schools can be either secular (laic) or religious (confessionnel). Religious schools 
were the pioneers in private education in Côte d’Ivoire.  At the primary level, religious schools 
dominate the private school market, while Catholic schools dominate the private religious sector 
at that level.  The situation is reversed at the secondary level, where secular schools dominate the 
private school market.  In total, there were 776 private primary schools and 294 private 
secondary schools in 1998-99.  About 50 percent were secular and the rest religious.  The 
majority of primary religious schools were Catholic (278 of 386, or 72 percent).  On the other 
hand, most of the private secondary schools were secular (257 of 294, or 87 percent).  About 78 
percent of the private secondary schools were Catholic.  About 60 percent were in Abidjan 
(Ministry of Education 1999).   8
 
Religious schools, and Catholic schools in particular, have the reputation of being the 
highest quality schools, as measured by exam scores.  Students in some religious schools 
perform much better than the average.  For example, in 1998, students from Catholic schools 
such as N. Dame Du Plateau, Notre Dame d’Afrique and St. Jean Bosco, achieved school leaving 
examination scores of at least 70 percent, compared to an overall average of 36 percent for all 
religious schools (Ministry of Education 1998).  The higher apparent quality of religious schools 
is attributed mostly to the fact that they can afford to hire better teachers and acquire better 
teaching resources than other private schools, since they can top-up their fee and state funding 
with church funds (World Bank 1995). 
 
Private school fees vary according to whether the school is religious or secular, where it 
is located, and the quality of education provided.  Elite schools (such as French schools) have the 
highest fees.  However, secular private school fees, even among “non-elite” schools tend to be 
high, ranging from $100-200 to well over $1,000.  Religious school fees are much lower, ranging 
from a few dollars in rural areas to $166 in Abidjan.  There are disparities in fees charged by 
religious schools run by the same religious authority depending in the financial resources of the 
school.  Fees in wealthier religious schools tend to be higher than average, with the excess cross-
subsidizing schools in poorer areas.  Due to the large variation of fees across private schools, the 
per-student subsidy paid to private students ($200 or slightly more) exceeds the fees that many 
schools charge (World Bank 1999).  However, there are many cases where the reverse is true. 
 
   9
In 1995, the population of Côte d’Ivoire benefited from $25 per capita in subsidies paid 
through the education system as a whole; the per capita subsidy for public schools was $24 and 
for private schools $1.20.  However, education subsidies were unequally distributed across the 
population with urban areas benefiting with $36 while the benefit to rural areas was $16.50 
(Demery and others 1996).  Furthermore, subsidies favored higher-income families.  The poorest 
quintile received a per capita subsidy of about $17 from their use of publicly subsidized 
education, compared to $43 going to the top quintile.  This inequality applied to spending 
through both public and private schooling.  Despite this pattern of education subsidies, education 
spending in Côte d’Ivoire, while poorly targeted, is generally progressive.  The third dimension 
of inequality is due to gender differences.  Overall, females gained only about one-third of total 
education subsidies, and even less in lower quintiles.  On average, the per capita education 
subsidy to boys is almost twice that to girls (Demery and others 1996). 
 
  In 1997, the government of Côte d’Ivoire allocated almost $18 million for private school 
subsidies to 162,874 students (Ministry of Education 1997b).  Of this amount, just over $15 
million was dispensed.  On average, each of the 104,510 primary school pupils (6,263 in secular 
and 98,247 in religious schools) benefited by about $47 ($43.50 for secular and $47.20 for 
religious school pupils).  The subsidy benefit for each of the 58,364 secondary school students 
(48,103 in secular and 10,261 in religious schools) was $177.5 ($175.50 for students in secular 
schools and $187.50 in religious schools). 
   10
Data and Methods 
The 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages, a nationally representative household 
survey in Côte d’Ivoire, is used to analyze the distributional aspects of public spending.  From 
the raw file, an initial working file was extracted containing individuals of school age (6-30 years 
old).  Information about characteristics of the head of household, the spouse of the head, as well 
as other household information was extracted and merged with the initial working file. The 
sample contains approximately 9,000 observations relating to family members of school age of 
whom approximately 5,100 attended school in school year 1997-98; of those, 4,560 attended 
public schools and 550 (or approximately 11 percent) attended private schools. Among those 
who attended school, 965 (19 percent) received some form of education subsidy, 836 (or 86.5 
percent) going to public schools and 129 (or 13.5 percent) going to private schools. 
 
The overall gross enrollment rate (for school age children 6-29 years old), was about 56 
percent in 1997-98: 61 percent for boys and 50.5 percent for girls (Table 2).  The gross primary 
enrollment rate was just over 70 percent (73 percent for boys and 66 percent for girls).  About 57 
percent of secondary school age children were attending school (66 percent of boys and 46.5 
percent of girls), 25 percent of whom were still in primary school (28 percent of boys and 22 
percent of girls).  About 27 percent those over 18 years were attending school (32 percent of 
boys and 21 percent of girls), 14 percent of whom were still attending secondary school (17 
percent of boys and 10.5 percent of girls).  The above estimates confirm the reported high 
repetition rates in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
Overall school attendance varies between urban and rural areas, with 62 percent attending   11
school in urban areas (67 percent for boys and 56 percent for girls) and 49 percent in rural areas 
(53 percent for boys and 43 percent for girls).  School attendance rates increase with family 
purchasing power.  About 48 percent of children in the lowest quintile were attending school in 
1997-98, compared to 52 percent in the 2
nd quintile, 56 percent in the 3
rd quintile, 60 in the 4
th 
quintile and 65 percent in the highest quintile. 
 
Table 2: Enrollment Rates by Level, Sex and Region and Income Quintile, 1997/98 (%) 
 Male  Female  Total 












Education Level     
Primary  73 66 70 
Secondary  66 47 57 
Tertiary  32 21 27 
All  levels  61 51 56 
     
Urban  67 56 62 
Rural  53 43 49 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
 
 
Children attending private schools are more often in urban areas compared to children 
attending public schools (Table 3).  More than 50 percent of children attending private schools 
are secondary or tertiary students compared to 34 percent of children attending public schools.  
Among the children attending private schools, 46 percent are girls, compared to 38 percent of 
children attending private schools.  About 26 percent of children in private schools are in 
families in which the head attended a private school, compared to 9 percent of children in public   12
schools.  Children attending private schools are found in families with much higher family 
income (as well as much higher household expenditure).  Families whose children attend private 
schools also receive a much higher average education subsidy. 
 
In the case of children attending public schools (Table 4), family spending on children’s 
education increases with the family’s spending power.  Households in the top quintile spend on 
average about 10 times more per child for the education of children in the family than families in 
the lowest quintile.  This differential is more pronounced in tertiary education (about 12 times) 
compared to primary and secondary education (about 8 times).   13
Table 3: Students Receiving Government Subsidies: Student and Family Characteristics,  
Private versus Public Schools 
































































Student status (%):  
Full-time  







Family Characteristics    
Mean total annual family wage income  2,606  5,490 
Mean total annual family expenditure  2,022   3,570 
Mean family annual education expenditure  215  476 
Mean annual education subsidy  172  269 









Education level of head (%):  
primary or less 
secondary (some or completed)  


















N   841 133 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
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Table 4: Family education expenditure
+ per child, by total family expenditure quintile and 
level of education (public schools only), in $ 
Quintile  Primary Secondary Tertiary All  levels 
1st 70  111 92 77 
2nd 136 172  88*  144 
3rd 160 309 272*  187 
4th 307 374 386 340 
5th 547 889  1,075 767 
All  (mean)  238 484 613 338 
N  340 146  47 533 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
* less than 5 observations; + some values on household education expenditure are missing 
 
 
In the case of children attending private schools (Table 5), the overall family education 
expenditure per child is slightly more than double that of children in public schools. Otherwise, 
the distribution of family education expenditure per child across expenditure quintiles is very 
similar to that of children in public schools, with the education expenditure of families in the top 
quintile exceeding that if families in the lowest quintile by a factor of 8 to 1. 
 
Table 5: Family education
+ expenditure per child, by total family expenditure quintile and 
level of education (private schools only), in $ 
Quintile Primary  Secondary  Tertiary**  All  levels 
1st 158 245  91*  181 
2nd 289 332 379*  317 
3rd 760 912  - 827 
4th 652  1,347*  898 917 
5th 1,236 1,590 2,425*  1,450 
All  (mean)  615 902 869 750 
N  42 29 11 82 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
* less than 5 observations; ** Professional (technical) education institutions only as there are no private 
academic institutions; + some values on household education expenditure missing 
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Table 6: Government subsidy per child, by total family expenditure quintile and level of 
education (public schools only), in $ 
Quintile  Primary Secondary Tertiary All  levels 
1st 69  114 70 75 
2nd  78 130 189  97 
3
rd 142 172 327 155 
4
th 138 224 454 206 
5
th 305 316 398 325 
All  (mean)  129 208 355 173 
N  545 223  68 836 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
 
 
The subsidy amounts in Tables 6 and 7 were calculated as follows: (a) the relevant 
population was ranked by household expenditure; (b) the population was divided into 
expenditure quintiles; (c) the expenditure amount going to each quintile for each education level, 
as well as the number of children in each cell was calculated; (d) the expenditure amounts were 
divided by the number of children in each cell.  The same methodology was used in calculating 
the family education expenditure amounts in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
For those attending public schools (Table 6), the subsidy amount per student increases 
steadily as we go to higher expenditure quintiles.  Students from families in the highest (5
th) 
quintile receive four times more than families in the lowest quintile.  This finding is more 
pronounced in students in tertiary (professional) education.  On average, each student receives 
about $173 per year.  For those attending private schools (Table 7), the subsidy per student 
increases but the increase is less pronounced.  Students from families in the highest expenditure 
quintile receive just over twice the subsidy received by students from families in the lowest 





quintiles are of similar magnitude.  On average, each student going to public schools and are 
subsidized receive approximately $270 per year.  Overall, the allocation of subsidies seems to be   16
more equitable in the case of children attending private schools compared to those attending 
public schools. 
Table 7: Government subsidy per child, by total family expenditure quintile and level of 
education (private schools only), in $ 
Quintile Primary  Secondary  Tertiary**  All  levels 
1st 126 195  33*  147 
2nd 201 374 239 261 
3rd 360 266 350*  308 
4th 175 803 475 309 
5th 296 311 469*  322 
All  (mean)  219 360 215 269 
N  63 46 21  129 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
* less than 5 observations; ** Professional (technical) education institutions only 
 
In Tables 8 and 9, the information generated in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 is used to derive 
estimates of the percentage of family education expenses covered by subsidies across family 
expenditure quintiles.  In both the cases of public and private school attendance, there is a clear 
tendency for the share of family education expenditure covered by subsidy to decline as one goes 
to higher family expenditure quintile.  The subsidy system, therefore, seems to be progressive, 
and more so for private schools.  In public schools, almost all household education expenditure 
per child by families in the lowest quintile is covered by subsidies, compared to a 
subsidy/expenditure ratio of 42 percent for families in the highest quintile.  In private schools, 
the subsidy/expenditure ratio is 81 percent for families in the lowest quintile, compared to only 
22 percent for families in the highest quintile.  Nevertheless, this does not change the finding 
(Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7) that the more well off families (which spent much more on education of 
children) still receive a disproportionately large share of subsidy money, especially in the case of 
public school attendance.  The fact that well to do families benefit from subsidies seems to relate 
to the system of allocating subsidies.  At the primary level, the subsidy is linked to tuition fees   17
charged by the school (the higher the fee, the lower the subsidy per pupil) and not ability to pay.  
At the secondary level, the government sponsors students to attend secondary schools.  There 
could be several criteria for selecting students for sponsorship; it seems that family income is not 
the major consideration, allowing a substantial number of children of well to do families to be 
sponsored. 
Table 8: Percent of family education expenses per child covered by subsidy (subsidy/expenses 
ratio), by total family expenditure quintile  and level of education (public schools only) 
Quintile  Primary Secondary Tertiary All  levels 
1st  98 103* 76  98 
2nd  57  76 210* 67 
3rd  89  56 120* 83 
4th  45  60 118* 60 
5th 56 36 37 42 
All 54 43 58 51 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
* In these cases the reported subsidy amount received exceeds the reported amount spent by the family 
on children’s education; furthermore some of the tertiary education quintiles the cell size is less than 5 
 
Table 9: Percent of family education expenses per child covered by subsidy (subsidy/expenses 
ratio), by total family expenditure quintile and level of education (private schools only) 
Quintile  Primary Secondary Tertiary All  levels 
1st 80 80 37 81 
2nd  69 112* 63  82 
3rd 47 29  - 37 
4th 27 60 53 34 
5th 24 20 19 22 
All 36 40 25 36 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
* In theses cases, the reported subsidy amount received exceeds the reported amount spent by the 
family on children’s education; furthermore some of the tertiary education quintiles the cell size is less 
than 5   18
 
Table 10: Percent of family education expenses per child
+ covered by subsidy 
(subsidy/expenses ratio), by total family expenditure quintile and 
level of education (public schools only) 
Quintile  Primary Secondary Tertiary All  levels 
1st 79 58 78 75 
2nd  66  88 301* 75 
3rd  62  53 170* 67 
4th 42 58 59 49 
5th 68 56 62 66 
All 64 64 92 67 
N  324 143  45 512 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
+ The above was calculated using survey information on school expenses, namely answers to 
questions: “How many persons in all were covered by last school year’s school expenses?”, “Were 
some of these expenses borne partly or fully by any other person, your employer, the state (including 
student grants)? and “What is the total amount of this aid?”  * In these cases, the reported subsidy 
amount received exceeds the reported amount spent by the family on children’s education and some of 
the tertiary education quintiles the cell size is less than 5 
 
 
Table 11: Percent of family education expenses per child
+ covered by subsidy 
(subsidy/expenses ratio), by total family expenditure quintile and 
level of education (private schools only) 
Quintile  Primary Secondary Tertiary All  levels 
1st  115*  34 37 85 
2nd 52 57 90 59 
3rd 48 73  - 59 
4th 40 44 48 44 
5th 16 17 31 17 
All 58 45 53 53 
N  41 28 11 80 
Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
+ The above was calculated using survey information on school expenses, namely answers to 
questions: “How many persons in all were covered by last school year’s school expenses?”, “Were 
some of these expenses borne partly or fully by any other person, your employer, the state (including 
student grants)? and “What is the total amount of this aid?”  * In these cases, the reported subsidy 
amount received exceeds the reported amount spent by the family on children’s education; furthermore 




An alternative calculation of the subsidy/expenses ratio is presented in Tables 10 and 11 
by using the information on the total household education expenses, the total subsidy received by 
the family for all the members going to school and number of members covered by the school   19
expenses.  Here also one observes a progressive decline in the proportion of family education 
expenses covered by subsidies as one goes to higher family expenditure quintiles, more so in the 
case of private school attendance.  The results are qualitatively very similar to those presented in 
Tables 8 and 9. 
 
  School enrollment rates in Côte d’Ivoire increase moderately as one goes to successively 
higher household expenditure quintiles.  Male enrollment rates are significantly higher than 
female enrollments (61 percent compared to 51 percent) and enrollments in urban areas are 
significantly higher than enrollments in rural areas (65 percent compared to 49 percent).   
Children who attend private schools, typically, come from more affluent households; poorer 
households spend, on average, less than half on educating their children, compared to more 
affluent households.  On the other hand, although the mean dollar amount education subsidy per 
child is higher for children in private schools, 80 percent of education expenses per child going 
to a public school are covered by subsidies compared to 57 percent for children going to private 
schools (Table 3). 
 
  Comparing subsidies by household expenditure quintiles, dollar amount subsidies 
increase as one goes to higher expenditure quintiles, however, this increase is much less 
pronounced in the case of private school attendance.  Comparing the proportion of household 
education expenses covered by subsidies by quintile, permits the conclusion that the subsidy 
system is progressive, as the subsidy/expenses ratio continuously declines as the household 
purchasing power increases and more so in the case of private school attendance.  The 
progressivity of the system non-withstanding, the fact that well to do families benefit from   20
subsidies seems to relate to the system of allocating subsidies.  At the primary level, the subsidy 
is linked to tuition fees charged by the school (the higher the fee, the lower the subsidy per pupil) 
and not ability to pay; on the other hand, at the secondary level, the government sponsors 
students to attend secondary schools.  As a result, a substantial number of well to do families are 
sponsored. 
 
  Overall, while the existing system of public support to the private education sector plays 
an important role in maintaining the stability of the education system, further adjustments are 
needed to better direct decisions on distributing funds and encouraging the development 
investments in private provision of education in Côte d’Ivoire.  In particular, criteria for access to 
funding need to be refined, so that participation of children from less well to do families is 
widened.  This should be accompanied by stricter pupil performance criteria, linking funding to 
minimum performance and age limits by education level and cycle. 
 
Determinants of School Choice 
In enrolling their children in private rather than public schools, parents presumably 
believe that the additional cost, primarily in the form of higher fees, is outweighed by 
educational, social and other benefits of private schooling.  For example, private primary and 
secondary schools tend to enroll a larger proportion of their students in academic programs rather 
than vocational and general programs; as a result parents may expect that this will help their 
children get into college.  Furthermore, while public schools claim that they provide schooling 
that incorporates a secular set of values and knowledge, private schools project certain 
educational ideologies, thus attracting parents who agree with these ideologies (Chiswick and 
Koutroumanes 1996).  Finally, the screening of students in certain private schools, especially in   21
urban areas, allows for a more homogeneous student body in terms of social background, 
religion and other characteristics, something which is valued by many families. In contrast, 
public schools tend to admit a heterogeneous group of students from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds, religions and values. 
 
  Looking at the relative efficiency of private versus public schools in Côte d’Ivoire, using 
school repetition as a criterion, private religious schools exhibit the highest efficiency, followed 
by public schools, while private secular schools have the highest repletion rates.  For example, at 
the primary level, 88 percent of pupils in private religious schools complete primary school 
without repeating a school year, compared to 66 percent in public and 56 percent in private 
secular schools. At the secondary level (1
st cycle), the corresponding figures are 61 percent for 
private religious schools, 29 percent for public schools and 24 percent for private secular schools 
(ROCARE 2003). 
 
  Pupils in private schools, besides coming from a more educated and affluent background 
compared to pupils in public schools, have parents who show more active interest in their 
children’s schooling.  For example, 66 percent of parents of children in private religious schools 
participate often or always in school meetings, compared to 34 percent of parents of children in 
private secular schools and 28 percent of parents of children in public schools. 
 
  In the analysis below, it is hypothesized and tested that economic incentives influence the 
choice between private and public school.  Economic theory suggests that the most important 
determinants of demand for private schooling are income and price.  In particular, assuming that   22
schooling is a normal good, an increase in family income is expected to increase the demand for 
schooling, including its quality, for any given price of schooling.  Other potentially important 
determinants are various characteristics of the parents, especially the head of the family, such as 
religious affiliation, level of education and their own education experience; in particular, it is 
expected that when parents have attended private schools there is a higher probability that 
children will be enrolled in private schools. 
 
In general, the theoretical demand equation for private schooling is as follows: 
SCHOOL(private=1) = f(Y,  P, UR, RLGN, FEDUC,  MEDUC ), 
                                                              (+) (+) (-)       (+)         (+)          (+) 
 
where Y stands for family income (or expenditure), P for the cost of schooling, UR for urbanity, 
RLGN for religion (in this case, having Christianity as religion, hence a positive sign is 
expected), FEDUC and MEDUC for father’s education and mother’s education. 
 
  Ideally, the price variable should be the tuition charges of each school attended by the 
pupil.  The data available contain information on tuition fees paid as reported by the respondent.  
This is not a proper price variable and if used would result in a strong positive association, 
simply reflecting the fact that those who attend private schools pay higher fees.  The survey did 
not contain information on the fees charged by the school the child was attending (or which 
school the child attended).
1 
                                                 
1 An attempt at using an imperfect substitute for a price variable was made – namely the difference in the average 
cost of schooling between private and public schools across 59 communities in Côte d’Ivoire.  The coefficient, 
however, was clearly insignificant in the case of all children attending school, while in the case of children receiving 
subsidies, it had the correct sign (negative), but it was significant only at the 25 percent level.  
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The results from OLS and probit models for the probability of a child attending a private 
school versus a public school are presented below, for all children attending school in 1997-98 
(Table 12) and for children attending school in 1997-98 and receiving subsidies (Table 13). 
 
Table 12: Determinants of school choice, all children attending school in 1997-98 
Dependent variable: probability of attending private school 
 OLS  Probit 
Variable  Coefficient ( t-value)  Marginal Prob* ( z-value) 
Total Household Expenditure  3.77e-08 (12.61)    2.12e-08 (9.45) 
Christian (omitted: other)  0.014 (1.61)  0.017 (2.09) 
Urban area (omitted: rural)  0.620 (7.00)     0.076 (8.39) 
Head attended private school)  
(omitted: head attended public  
school)  
0.187 (9.84)  0.149 (7.65) 
Education of head:    
Secondary   
Tertiary   







Constant  -0.013 (1.64)     - 
N   
R-sq adjusted (or Pseudo R
2) 
Observed/Predicted prob. 






Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
Note:   dF/dX is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, instead of the potentially under-reported family income, total 
household expenditure was used.  After experimentation, the model includes five explanatory 
variables, namely total family expenditure, urban/rural residence, head having attended 
private/public school, and head’s level education, one dummy for Christian affiliation and the 
differences in education cost between private and public schools.  The most important 
determinants of private school choice are the income variable (in our case annual household   24
expenditure), the head having attended a private school and living in an urban area.   
Furthermore, the higher the level of education of the head of family, the higher the probability 
that the child is enrolled in a private school. 
 
The results from the two samples (all children in school and children receiving an 
education subsidy) are very similar to one another.  This is evident from inspecting the 
coefficient estimates from the OLS and probit (where coefficients measures the marginal 
effects). 
 
Table 13: Determinants of school choice, all children benefiting from subsidies: 
Dependent variable: probability of attending private school 
 OLS  Probit 
Variable**  Coefficient ( t-value)  Marginal Prob* ( z-value) 
Total Family Expenditure  2.68e-08 (3.43)  1.89e-08 (2.90)  
Christian (omitted: other)  0.016 (0.76)  0.019 (0.86) 
Urban area (omitted: rural)  0.081 (3.43)  0.094 (3.92) 
Head attended private school)  
(omitted: head attended public)  
0.202 (4.74)  0.170 (3.81) 
Education of head:     Tertiary  
(omitted: less than tertiary) 
0.123 (2.55)  0.097 (2.08) 
Constant 0.015  (0.69)  - 
N   









Source: Own calculations using the 1998 Enquête Niveau de Vie des Ménages 
* dF/dX is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; **  The sample of children receiving 
subsidies was too small to support the creation of an education cost proxy 
 
 
One question that can be raised in relation to the above estimated models has to do with 
sample selection bias; that is the possibility that there may be variables which could influence the 
decision to attend private school, but which may also affect education outcomes (such as 
distance to school and religion).  In detecting sample selection bias and correcting for it, a   25
Heckman correction for the probit estimates is used (Heckman 1979). 
 
The probit model with sample selection assumes that there exists an underlying 
relationship: 
y*j = xjβ + uij                  (latent equation) 
such that we observe only the binary outcome: 
yj
probit = (y*j >0)             (probit equation). 
The dependent variable, however, is not always observed.  Rather, the dependent variable 
for observation j is observed if 
                                          yj
select = (zjγ + u2j > 0)  (selection equation) 
where,                               u1 ~ N(0, 1) 
                                          u2 ~ N(0, 1) 
                                          corr(u1 ,u2) = ρ. 
When  ρ  ≠ 0, standard probit techniques applied to the first equation yield biased results.   
Estimation using the Heckman correction for probit yields consistent, asymptotically efficient 
estimates for the model parameters. 
 
  One observes whether children attend private school only if the child is attending school 
(in 1997-98).  In estimating the Heckman-corrected-model, the regressors used in the selection 
equation (dependent variable: binary variable taking the value of 1 if child attended school in 
1997-98 and 0 otherwise) and found statistically significant were: family expenditure (in place of 
family income), sex of child, two education dummies for head of household, two education 
dummies for the spouse of the head of family and one religion dummy.   26
 
  In this case, after testing for ρ = 0 vs. ρ ≠ 0, it is concluded that ρ = 0 (p-value for the chi-
square test was about 0.25).  This is the result of a likelihood-ratio test, by comparing the 
likelihood of the full model with the sum of the log-likelihoods for the probit and selection 
models.  Therefore, there is no evidence of sample selection and one can use the results from the 
simple probit model. 
 
The absence of a suitable cost of schooling (price) variable, impairs the results obtained 
from the demand for private schooling analysis.  It is, however, found that the higher the 
household purchasing power, the father having attended a private school and the higher the 




For both public and private schools, the subsidy amount per student increases steadily as 
one goes to higher expenditure quintiles. In the case of public schools, students from families in 
the highest quintile receive four times more than families in the lowest quintile. For those 
attending private schools, the subsidy per student increases, but the increase is less pronounced. 
Students from families in the highest expenditure quintile receive just over twice the subsidy 
received by students from families in the lowest quintile. Overall, the allocation of subsidies 
seems to be more equitable in the case of children attending private schools compared to those 
attending public schools.  
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Looking at estimates of the percentage of family education expenses covered by subsidies 
across family expenditure quintiles revealed that, in both the cases of public and private school 
attendance, there is a clear tendency for the share of family education expenditure covered by 
subsidies to decline as one goes to higher family expenditure quintile. This decline, however, is 
significantly more pronounced in the case of private schools. The subsidy system, therefore, 
seems to be progressive, and more so for private schools. 
 
A demand equation for private school attendance (probability of a child attending a 
private school versus a public school in 1997-98) was estimated by testing the hypothesis that 
economic incentives influence the choice between private and public school, using OLS and 
probit model specifications. The most important determinants of private school choice are the 
income variable (in our case annual household expenditure), the head having attended a private 
school and living in an urban area. Furthermore, the higher the level of education of the head of 
family, the higher the probability that the child is enrolled in a private school. 
 
Finally, on a different note, one can draw attention to the issue of sensitivity of private to 
public enrollment in relation to government interventions in the education sector. One can be 
fairly certain that the overall education sector in Côte d’Ivoire will be growing to improve access 
to education.  One way to effect such growth is by providing more public school places. 
However, once there is an active private sector already in place, which provides a viable 
alternative to the public education sector, a (possibly) strong substitution effect may be present 
which wound impede the efficiency gain from government intervention; this is because the 
public expansion may, partially, crowd out students who would have gone to private schools.    28
Jimenez and Sawada (2001) find a substantial crowding-out effect in the case of the Philippines. 
Therefore, one must look beyond the public sector. Côte d’Ivoire provides an example of a 
country where the private sector can be utilized to achieve better delivery of public services.  The 
key is to align the subsidy allocation system – the funding formula – with household income of 
subsidy recipients so that the poor will have better access to quality education services.   29
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